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Several countries are responding to the climate change threat with various policy measures (e.g., taxes, 
permit  trading,  regulations,  information  campaigns,  etc).  While  the  effectiveness  of  different  measures 
(instruments)  has  been studied  extensively,  very  little  research  exists  related  to  public  preferences  for 
alternative  measures.  This  paper  describes  the  results  of  a  pilot  study  to  determine  whether  a  choice 
experiment might be a feasible approach for measuring preferences for carbon dioxide reduction policies, 
while ensuring careful consideration of the budget constraint facing households.  We focus on estimating 
the public’s marginal utilities and implicit prices for a select group of attributes that describe climate policy 
measures in general. The results from the pilot study indicate that when respondents trade-off the cost of 
alternative  and  unlabeled  policy  measures,  they  are  willing  to  pay  for  those  that  encourage  (1)  the 
development  of  environmentally-friendly  technology  and  (2)  climate  awareness  among  the  Swedish 
population. Finding (1) could be interpreted to mean public support for market-based measures (e.g., taxes 
and permit trading) while finding (2) seems to support the use of information in the design of climate policy 
measures in order to encourage carbon dioxide-reducing behavior. Finally, our pilot study assumed that 
respondents’ preferences for the cost-sharing burden (equity) of measures might be defined in terms of an 
individual’s ability to pay. Given this assumption, our results indicate weak preferences for non-regressive 
cost  distribution,  but  progressive cost  distribution  had  no  effect  on  choice.  We  offer  several  possible 
conclusions from this preliminary investigation into climate policy preferences.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Climate policy is a salient issue.  Since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in December 1997 (entering 
into  force  in  2005)  Annex  I  countries
2  have  pledged  to  reduce  the  collective  emissions  of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 5.2% compared to the 1990 levels by the year 2012.  The primary 
GHG is carbon dioxide (CO2). Emissions of carbon dioxide have grown exponentially on a global 
scale
3 in recent years and have been linked to the burning of fossil fuels.  Mounting evidence 
suggests that rising global temperatures are likely to lead to negative ecological and economic 
impacts. Various reports have noted that the economic impacts of inaction (“business as usual”) 
are potentially very high (Stern et al, 2006). 
 
To prevent both environmental damage and potentially deteriorating economic conditions, Annex 
I countries are  responding  with  various  types of policy  measures or  instruments
4 (e.g., taxes, 
emissions permit trading, subsidies, regulations, information campaigns, etc).  In Swed en, the 
greening of the tax system began in 1991 when  corrective environmental taxes (e.g., carbon tax, 
electricity tax, sulfur tax, etc) were implemented in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and 
simultaneously reduce the levels of existing distortionary income taxes (Brännlund and Kriström, 
1997; Brännlund and Nordström, 1994). In the U.S. (which is not an Annex I country and has not 
ratified the Kyoto protocol), Congressional  action to reduce GHGs appears  likely  in  the  near 
future, though the debate over which type of measure to implement is fierce.  Congress has shown 
a preference for an emission permit trading system,
5 although some business groups and others 
have argued that a carbon tax  at the point of importation or extraction would be a more e ffective 
policy instrument (USEPA 2007;  Williams and Zabel, 2008).  
 
Given that countries have a variety of climate policy measures at their disposal, how might they 
select among competing instruments to achieve carbon reduction? One approach might be to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative measures. Measures that reduce emissions at the lowest 
cost – while accounting for uncertainty about future probability of success – might provide the 
best instrument. Given this approach and criteria it is well known that a broad-based carbon tax or 
                                                 
2 The Kyoto protocol divides countries into three categories: Annex I (40 industrial countries plus the EU), Annex II 
(developed countries that pay for developing countries), and Annex II (developing countries). 
3 While the global trend has been exponential growth, emissions in Sweden have been an exception, showing a steady 
decline since 1970 (see Brännlund 2008). 
4 We use the terms “measures” and “instruments” and “mechanisms” interchangeably throughout. 
5 A cap and trade system is a form of emissions permit trading where the government sets the total limit of allowable 
emissions for some pollutant (e.g., carbon dioxide) and auctions (or gives away) “emission permits” that grant each 
owner the right to emit a certain amount of a pollutant. By allowing the emission permits to be traded on a market, it 
will encourage emission reductions at the lowest marginal cost.    3 
broad-based cap and  trade program  will be the  most preferred  measures.  These  measures will 
result  in an emission reduction at the  lowest cost.  However,  in spite of this we see that  many 
countries are  hesitant to  use  such  cost-efficient  measures or at  least to  use  them  to their  full 
potential extent. One reason for this is that the decision-makers and/or the public encounter some 
kind of disutility, pecuniary or  non-pecuniary,  with  the tax or the cap and trade program. For 
example,  there  may  be  a  disutility  related  to  taxes  in  general  ("stigma  effect"),  and/or  the 
distribution  of  a  measures'  economic  burden  may  not  correspond  to  the  decision-makers' 
preferences of a “fair” distribution of welfare. In other words, there  may be a trade-off between 
efficiency and “fairness” or some other pecuniary or non-pecuniary effect.  As a result  it  is  no 
longer given that the choice of instrument should be based on cost-efficiency only.  
 
Thus, an alternative approach, which is pursued in this paper, is to assess citizens' preferences for 
different types of measures (by "citizens" we mean the general public
6). The motivation for this 
approach is that given a government’s stated goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions,
7 measures 
that reflect public preferences are more likely to receive general support, thus facilitating carbon 
reduction policies. If instead policy-makers developed or try to implement “cost-effective” carbon 
reduction policies that fail to reflect citizen preferences, the measures may fail to accomplish the 
stated objective (or lead the public to vote their (democratic) government out of office). In simple 
terms,  a  policy-maker’s  agenda  that  mirrors  the  public’s  concerns  will  lead  to  trust,  mutual 
understanding and more successful outcomes.
  
 
Previous research has queried the public about their disposition toward alternative climate policy  
measures. For example,  Hammar och Jagers (2002) administered a survey that asked Swedish 
citizens  whether  they  preferred  taxes  against  an  environmental  “bad”  (e.g.,  carbon  dioxide 
emissions) or subsidies to encourage an environmental “good” (e.g., renewable energy). But, as 
the authors admit, the approach was flawed because the survey failed to make clear to respondents 
that both an income in the form of a “green subsidy” and an expenditure in the form of a “green 
tax”  would  impose  costs  on  the  government  and,  therefore,  their  taxpaying  household.  Not 
surprisingly, most respondents preferred to receive, rather than spend, money. A better approach 
for measuring citizen preferences would consider the cost that comes with alternative preferences 
                                                 
6  Previous  studies  have  examined  whether  preferences  for  environmental  policies  differ  across  different  parts  of 
society  (e.g.,  policy  makers,  experts,  and  the  general  public).    Carlsson  et  al  (2007)  find  that  preferences  for 
environmental policies do in fact differ between administrators and the public. In a somewhat related paper Colombo 
et al., (2007) find that the relative importance that experts and citizens ascribe to different attributes of a right of way 
conservation program in England are very similar, suggesting that public preferences for changes to this program may 
be obtained more cost-effectively by querying a group of experts. 
7  Sweden  has  pledged  to  reduce  carbon  dioxide  reduction  by  four  percent  by  2010  (Swedish  Ministry  of  the 
Environment, 2008). Most Annex I countries have similar goals.   4 
(i.e., how much income a respondent is willing to trade-off in return for a preferred measure or 
characteristic of a measure). 
 
A  US  study  surveyed  1,500  adults  in  2007  to  assess  preferences  for  specific  climate  policy 
measures while ensuring that respondents considered the costs of the measures (Bannon et al., 
2007). The study elicits preferences for three types of measures by name: regulation, emissions 
tax, and an emissions trading system (the survey referred to these three types of measures within 
both the electricity and vehicle use sectors).  Respondents were told that the government wants to 
reduce greenhouse emissions by five percent by 2020 and the survey asks for their preferences for 
different  ways of achieving this.  The emissions reduction  was  held constant and  the costs of 
alternative  policy  measures  varied.  The  survey  described  “standards/regulations”  as  the 
government telling industry what they can and cannot do. The other two measures are described 
similarly  in the  sense  that both  would cause  industry to come  up  with  new ways of creating 
electricity/developing gasoline. Interestingly, despite the fact that the economic literature suggests 
that  “taxes”  and  “emissions  trading”  approaches  are  more  likely  to  lead  to  innovation  and 
technological development, the respondents preferred the regulatory approach – but only at very 
low cost levels.
8 The authors suggested that the American public may  not trust market forces to 
accomplish carbon dioxide reduction, preferring instead concrete government action via a rule -
making.  An alternative interpretation might be that Americans dislike taxes. 
 
The purpose of this research is to develop an improved method for measuring public preferences 
for climate policy measures. To account for the weakness in the Hammar and Jagars (2002) study, 
our approach will ask respondents to state their preferences while accounting for the  household’s 
budget constraint  vis a vis taxes and spending.   Furthermore, to avoid the stigma that  is often 
associated with the name of certain measures, we will describe climate policy measures in terms of 
characteristics or attributes rather than by name. Our method relies on a choice experiment (CE) 
approach, which asks survey respondents to choose a good (a climate policy measure) from a list 
of  alternatives  that  are  described  by  general  characteristics.    Respondents  face  repeated  CE 
questions, where the  levels of  the attributes are  varied  in each question.  By  manipulating  the 
variables of  interest (attributes),  we can observe  the  impact  this  has on the response  variable: 
choice.  By  including  a  cost  attribute,  we  can  estimate  a  monetary  value  for  the  trade-offs 
respondents  inherently  make when choosing between  goods.  These  implicit trade-offs provide 
                                                 
8 The survey instrument did not inform respondents of the economic benefits (e.g., technological development) of the 
tax and cap-and-trade approaches. This may have been intentional on the part of the authors.   5 
policy-makers with useful information in the development of carbon reduction policies that garner 
public support. 
 
The advantage of a choice experiment is that it mimics decisions in actual markets. For example, 
when consumers make a choice to purchase a good, they compare the attributes of the different 
alternatives  such  as  taste,  packaging,  brand  name,  price,  etc  and  choose  one  to  purchase. 
Importantly, CE surveys rely on the fact that respondents are inherently “well-trained” in trading-
off  relevant  attributes  for  a  good  they  frequently  purchase.  For  example,  such  surveys  are 
commonly used to assess how fisherman trade-off size or quantity of catch against the cost of a 
particular site (Paulrud, 2004). Our social experiment makes a similar assumption, namely that 
citizens are able to weigh the attributes (including cost) of alternative climate policy measures and 
choose the one that they prefer. An equally important assumption is that we have identified all the 




The rest of the paper  is organized as  follows.  Section 2 provides the economic and  statistical 
theory for a choice experiment. Section 3 explains the development of our survey instrument and 
data  collection  and  Section  4  provides  our  empirical  choice  model  specification.    Section  5 
summarizes the results of the statistical analysis and Section 6 provides a discussion.  
 
2  ECONOMIC THEORY 
Economists often begin with  two key assumptions describing  human behavior and choice: (1) 
individuals act rationally and consider all information at their disposal and (2) individuals make 
decisions  that  maximize  their  utility,  subject  to  their  constraints  (e.g.,  income,  time,  other 
purchases already made, etc). Here we employ these assumptions through a random utility model 
(RUM). Each individual faces a choice among M alternatives. For each alternative the individual, 
say individual n, obtains a certain level of utility which we can denote as Unm, m = 1,…M. A 
utility-maximizing individual will then choose the alternative that provides the highest utility. The 
difference  between  alternatives,  with  respect  to  utility,  follows  from  differences  in  attributes 
between the alternatives. Here we denote the vector of attributes, facing individual n, associated to 
choice m as xnm. Thus the behavioral model becomes: chose alternative m if and only if Unm > Unk, 
                                                 
9  More specifically  we  will  assume  that the  effects  of  attributes  not  included  are  uncorrelated  with  the  effects  of 
attributes that are included.   6 
m ≠ k. This is to say that if the attributes associated with alternative m provides a utility higher 
than any other alternative, an individual will choose m.  
 
However, as analysts we cannot peer inside the mind of the decision maker, and therefore we must 
develop a  model that can handle the  unobservable factors affecting an  individual‟s choice.  As 
analysts we can observe the attributes for each alternative that each individual is facing, labeled 
xnm, as well as (some) of the attributes characterizing the individual, labeled sn. Given this we can 
in principle partition the utility function, Unm, into a deterministic or representative part, Vnm, and a 
(for the analyst) unobservable or random part, nm, i.e.; 
( , ) nm nm n nm U V x s   ,     n = 1,…, N;     m = 1,…, M      (1) 
The probability that individual n chooses alternative m over other alternatives can then be written 
as: 
Pr( ) Pr( , all  )
Pr( , all  )
Pr( , all  )
nm nm nk
nm nm nk nk
nk nm nm nk
P m C U U k C
V V k C
V V k C


   
    
    
,      (2) 
where C is the complete choice set. 
 
From (2) it is clear that it is the utility difference between alternatives that matters for the choice 
and, due to the unobserved part, we can only assign probabilities of an individual's choice. By 
making  some  assumptions  about  the  distribution  of  random  terms,  and  making  use  of  some 
specific parametric function of V(xnm, sn), we can statistically estimate the probabilities.  
 
Thus, to make the random utility model functional, we must make some assumption about the 
error term associated with each alternative-specific utility function.
10  m represents some random 
and unknown contribution to an individual‟s utility function of selecting alternative m. To estimate 
the parameters  in the  utility  function, we  must enforce two key assumptions  upon  it. The  first 
(maintained) assumption refers to the  unobserved component of  utility  for each individual and 
states that this component is located on some (unknown) distribution and randomly assigned to 
each person. Therefore, our task is to assume some distribution and then determine how to assign 
each individual the portion of their utility associated with the unobserved component. The second 
                                                 
10 There is a theoretical indirect utility function for each and every alternative the respondent faces. Note that in our 
case of an unlabeled experiment, there is no specific alternative (see Hensher et al. 2005)   7 
(testable) assumption refers to the unobserved component of utility for each alternative and states 
that its component is also part of some unknown distribution with individuals assigned locations 
randomly (within the distribution that defines utility values). Together, these assumptions classify 
the  random  component  as  being  independent  and  identically  distributed,  or  IID.    The  IID 
assumption says that each m has its own unique mean value across alternatives, bu
11t that each 
alternative‟s  is  not correlated  with  the  from another alternative (independent) and that the 
distribution of all ‟s (regardless of the alternative) are the same (identically distributed). Another 
way to think about this  is that there are different sources of  uncertainty  when predicting  the 
probability of a choice outcome, but we apply a strict assumption that all of the uncertainty is 
captured by a single unknown,  (note we drop the alternative-specific index). By collapsing all 
uncertainty  into  a  single  variable  we  are  assuming  these  uncertainties  are  not  related  in  any 
systematic way. 
 
Here  we  will  follow  the  usual  assumption  that  the  errors  are  extreme  value  IID  distributed 
(McFadden,  1974).  Given  this,  we  will,  after  some  manipulations,  obtain  the  logistic  choice 
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where znm = [xnm, sn], and  is the corresponding parameter vector. 
                                                 
11 The IID assumption is a data assumption.  An equally important assumption in an MNL model (involving at least 
three  alternatives)  is  a  behavioral  assumption  known  as  Independence  of  Irrelevant  Alternatives  (IIA).  This 
assumption  maintains  that  if  an  individual  prefers  Alternative  A  to Alternative  B  (in  the  choice  set  [A,B]),  then 
introducing a third alternative X (which expands the choice set to [A,B,X]) must not make B preferable to A (Laitila, 
2007).  Unlike the IID assumption, IIA can be tested. However, it is not relevant in our empirical application below 
which involves only two choice alternatives (Carlsson, 2009). 
12 Note that  = */, where   is the variance of the unobserved factors. Thus  reflects the effect of the observed 
variable,  relative to the variance in the unobserved factors. Furthermore,  it is clear that the ratio between any two 
parameters is independent of the scale factor, .   8 
If we now let ynm = 1 if individual n chooses m, and zero otherwise, we can write the probability 
for an  individual choosing the alternative  he/she was observed to chose as  ()
m y
m nm P  , which 
means that the likelihood function can be written as: 
( ) ( )
m y
nmnm LP  β          (5) 
Maximizing (5) with respect to  gives us the estimate of the  vector. 
 
Given the linear utility index it is easy to see that factors (variables) that do not change over the 
alternatives do not affect the choice probabilities.  This  means that  under a  linear specification 
individual characteristics do not affect the choice probabilities. 
 
3  DATA AND SURVEY DEVELOPMENT 
Data for our theoretical model was collected through a choice experiment survey.  The survey 
instrument required development and testing as well as consideration of the experimental design. 
The attributes and attribute  levels (along  with the survey  format and  information presentation) 
were tested in four focus groups between November 2007 and January 2008, comprising a total of 
31 individuals (13 male; 19 female).
13 The goal of survey development was to describe climate 
policy  measures to the publi c  in an easy to understand  manner. Without clear attributes and 
attribute  levels that distinguish one policy  measure from one another,  it  may be difficult for 
respondents to identify how each measure affects their utility, which would cause our theoretical  
model to  fail  in predicting choice.  Below we describe  the attributes  used  in this study and 
summarize the key aspects of the experimental (statistical) design. 
 
The  International  Panel  on  Climate  Change,  IPCC,  identifies  seven  types  of  climate  policy 
mitigation measures
14 (IPCC 2007). We studied these measures and developed generic attributes 
(and attribute levels) that could be used to describe these measures. This attribute -based approach 
led to an initial list of attributes describing climate policy measures as summarized in Fel! Hittar 
inte referenskälla..  To avoid survey complexity  we reduced this  initial  list based on  various 
considerations. Some  measures were difficult to  measure (e.g., attribute  levels  for  timing were 
subjective and difficult to estimate from the experience of existing policy measures), while others 
were too similar and therefore difficult for respondents to distinguish (e.g., future flexibility and 
                                                 
13 See Cole 2008 for more information about focus group participants and conclusions from focus group testing. 
14 These include (1) Regulations & Standards, (2) Price Mechanism  – Taxes/Charges, (3)Price Mechanism – Tradable 
Permits, (4) Financial Incentives (subsidies), (5) Voluntary Agreements, (6) Information instruments, and (7) Public 
R&D.   9 
regulatory flexibility).   The attribute “effectiveness of carbon dioxide reduction”  is a seemingly 
relevant attribute that could be  used to test  for trade-offs related  to a  measure‟s  likelihood of 
success.  However,  we  decided  that  the  relevant  policy  context  in  Sweden  is  based  on  the 
government‟s de facto decision to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by four percent by the year 
2010 (Swedish Ministry of  the Environment, 2008). Thus,  varying this attribute did  not seem 
realistic. Therefore, we asked respondents to choose the measure they think is best to accomplish 
the given four percent reduction (note this renders the opt-out option irrelevant).  
Table 1 Initial list of climate policy measure attributes. 
Potential Attribute  Description  Potential  attribute level 
Effectiveness of carbon 
dioxide reduction 
How  effective  (and/or  certain)  is  the  measure  at 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions.  
Percent  reductions  in  carbon 
dioxide  (compared  to  1990 
levels by 2012) 
Future flexibility 
Flexibility of  measure to adapt to changing future 
conditions  (e.g.,  inflation,  measure‟s  cost, 
technological  progress,  newly  identified  carbon 
dioxide sources) 
Low, medium, high flexibility 
Regulatory flexibility  Regulated  entity‟s  flexibility  to  choose  method  to 
meet compliance   




Whether the measure encourage/hinders the spread 
of new ideas and solutions  





A measure of the information effect that arises from 
the policy measure (e.g., some measures can affect 
peoples‟ awareness of how their actions affect the 
climate,  which  can  lead  to  people  acting  more 
climate friendly) 
Low,  medium,  high  effect  on 
awareness 
Cost  Cost to an individual to implement the measure.   Annual/monthly  cost  (in  3 
levels) 
Distribution of Costs 
A measure of how the cost measure is distributed 
among the population  
Progressive,  proportional  or 
regressive 
Effect on (net) 
government revenue 
Whether or not the instrument is likely to lead to a 
net gain in government revenue 
Positive, negative, neutral effect 
 
Cost-effectiveness  A measure of the cost per unit reduction of carbon 
dioxide 
X  SEK  per  ton  of  carbon 
dioxide reduced (in 3 levels) 
Enforcement 
mechanism 
Identifies how/if government enforces the measure  Compulsory, voluntary 
Timing 
How  long  it  takes  for  the  measure  to  reach  its 
objective of carbon dioxide reduction 
Number of years 
 
The  final attributes  used  in  this  study are  shown  in  Fel!  Hittar inte  referenskälla.. The cost 
attribute is an important part of any choice experiment because its parameter allows us to convert 
utility  into  its  monetary equivalent. We told respondents that each  measure would result  in an 
increase in the cost of the goods and services they regularly buy each month.  Cost distribution is 
to investigate preferences for the distribution of the cost associated with climate policy measures. 
In our experiment we have chosen to define burden-sharing in terms of a citizen‟s ability to pay   10 
for  proposed  environmental  improvements.
15  We  told  respondents  that  measures  coul d  be 
distributed in one of three ways (regressive, proportional, progressive) and provided simple warm-
up questions to ensure they understood the difference.  The  effect on environmental awareness 
attribute  has been selected  to  investigate the potential  impact of  information effects  in carbon 
dioxide reduction policies. We explained this attribute to respondents by saying that some climate 
policy measures  impact peoples‟ awareness of how their actions affect the climate and therefore 
can lead people to act more ”climate-friendly,” resulting in reduced emissions.  Finally, the effect 
on technological progress can be used as a means to distinguish theoretically between a regulatory 
standard and a market measure such as a tax or tradeable permits. A market measure has the effect 
of  increasing  the  marginal  cost  of  producing  carbon  dioxide,  which  creates  an  incentive  for 
polluters to innovate and find ways of avoiding this cost, while still maintaining production. This 
innovation  is  thought  to  lead  to  technological  improvements.  We  explained  this  attribute  to 
respondents  by  saying  that  some  measures  can  affect  a  company‟s  willingness  to  invest  in 
technologies, which can make it easier and more effective to reduce emissions in the future. 
Table 2. Summary of attributes used in the survey. 
Attribute  Description provided to respondent  Attribute levels used 




Some  measures  can  affect  a  company‟s 
willingness  to  invest  in  new 
technologies,  which  can  make  it  easier 
and  more  effective  to  reduce  emissions 




Has a positive effect on 
the Swedish populations’ 
awareness of climate 
change (AWARE) 
Some  measures  can  affect  peoples‟ 
awareness of how their actions affect the 
climate, which can lead to people acting 




Social distribution of 
costs (DIST) 
A reduction of carbon dioxide emissions 
imposes  a  cost on society,  but this  cost 
can  be  distributed  across  society  in 
different ways. 
All citizens pay the same amount, 
independent of income; 
All  citizens  pay  the  same 
percentage of income; 
Higher  income  citizens  pay  a 
higher percentage of income 
Monthly cost to you until 
2010 (COST) 
The  measure  would  impose  a  monthly 
cost in terms of an increase in the cost of 







Final attribute levels were determined through discussion and focus group testing. To determine 
the  level  of  the  bid  amounts  we  considered  a  study  that  estimated  the  costs  of  the  Swedish 
                                                 
15  A  strict  interpretation  of  one‟s  true  “ability  to  pay”  might  be  100%  of  one‟s  income.  Under  such  a  rigid 
interpretation one might suggest that we instead refer to our burden-sharing criteria in terms of one‟s “willingness to 
pay” instead.  However, we feel that this interpretation ignores practical costs of living considerations. Therefore, we 
assume  that  one‟s  income  is  a proxy  for  one‟s  “ability  to pay,”  even though some  low  income  earners  might  be 
“willing” to pay more of their income than high income earners for an environmental good.    11 
government‟s  four percent carbon dioxide reduction policy (Carlén, 2004) at between 5 and 8 
billion SEK. Given a population of nine million in Sweden, this is approximately 600 to 1,000 
SEK per person (dividing by households would give a higher per unit figure). Although this gives 
us a starting point for bid amounts, we acknowledge that the cost of achieving this reduction may 
or  may  not  be  a  reasonable  proxy  for  an  individual‟s  welfare  change  associated  with  this 
reduction.  
3.1.1  Generating the experimental design 
Experimental design refers to the process of ensuring that respondents face sufficient variation of 
(uncorrelated) attribute  levels across surveys so that we can develop testable  hypotheses  (e.g., 
about individuals‟ preferences for policy measure attributes).  In addition, the experimental design 
stage has a direct impact on the statistical efficiency of the model parameters we wish to estimate 
(For  this  reason,  it  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  “statistical  design”).  Developing  an 
experimental design necessarily involves trade-offs between attribute level correlation, parameter 
efficiency (minimum variance of model estimators), respondent burden/complexity, and cost (e.g. 
number of choice experiment questions and/or number of survey versions). 
 
Our experimental design  relies  upon a  simple orthogonal
16  main effects plan (OMEP) that is 
generated by SPSS‟s generate orthogonal design feature, based upon the number of parameters we 
wish to estimate (four). We then (non-randomly) group the generated alternatives (profiles) into 
our two-alternative choice sets (see strategy #1 in Street et al 2005).  This simple design approach, 
combined with the consideration of the required degrees of freedom described below, ensures the 
uncorrelated estimation of the main effect parameters only, which means we have chosen a priori 
to ignore possible  interaction effects that may exist between our attributes.
17 The details of our 
experimental design are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
The drawback to an OMEP design is the possibility of unwanted  overlap of the attributes in our 
pairings (i.e., attribute levels will occasionally repeat themselves in our design) and/or the lack of 
balance between attribute levels (i.e., levels may not appear with equal frequency in our design). 
The existence of these drawbacks implies that an OMEP design may not maximize the amount of 
                                                 
16 An orthogonal design is a mathematical constraint that ensures all attribute levels are statistically independent of 
one another. In labeled experiments it is important that attributes are uncorrelated across alternatives. In our unlabeled 
experiment (or  labeled experiments that estimate generic parameters), the criterion is  less strict:  within-alternative 
orthogonality is the objective. 
17 We acknowledge that our assumption that the parameters associated with all int eraction effects (including two-and 
three- way interaction effects) are zero is a strong assumption and cannot be tested. The implication is that if these 
parameters are not statistically insignificant, then our model will produce suboptimal results.   12 
information we can obtain  from our design.
18  However, rather than assigning alternatives to 
choice sets  at random,  we attempt  to allocate them  in a way that  minimizes (but does  not 
completely remove) overlap and balance problems (see Appendix 1). 
 
While an OMEP is a necessary starting point in an experimental design (it ensures uncorrelated 
attributes or attributes levels), it only applies in cases of linear models and it does not address the 
issue of statistical efficiency. That is, if we have information a priori about how respondents think 
about the attributes in our experiment (i.e., we suspect that respondents prefer attribute level 1 to 
attribute  level  2),  then  we  can  theoretically  improve  the  statistical  efficiency  of  our  design. 
However, designs capable of including this type of information are rarely used (Carlsson Lecture, 
2008). 
 
Therefore, although our OMEP design is capable of uncorrelated estimation of main effects, it (1) 
assumes all interaction effects are zero and (2) does not necessarily ensure the minimum variance 
of our estimators.  That is, a more sophisticated design might be capable of estimating selected 
interaction effects (if we believe they exist) and of generating model parameters with a smaller 
standard error (see for example strategy 5 in Street et al 2005).  However, a more sophisticated 
design would also entail greater costs in the form of additional choice questions (or - in the case of 
blocking  -  additional  surveys).  We  chose  instead  for  this  pilot  study  to  maintain  a  simple 
experimental design based on an OMEP. 
 
The survey instrument includes warm-up questions and other information to be used as additional 
explanatory  variables.    We  include  what  Hensher  et  al.,  (2005)  refer  to  as  “proxies  for  an 
individual‟s tastes” which describe a respondent‟s inherent characteristics such as income, age, 
gender, occupation, etc (individual characteristics). We also include additional variables of interest 
such as a respondent‟s environmental attitudes and behaviors, whether they are members in an 
environmental organization or drive a car  to work everyday. This  information can be  used  to 
determine whether some attributes are more preferable by certain segments of the population.   
 
                                                 
18 Note the trade-off here: If we ensure no overlap and perfect balance, we may be increasing the complexity of the 
design due to the fact that a comparison of two alternatives necessarily implies that all attribute levels are different, 
which can increase the cognitive burden of the respondent (see Swait and Adamowicz (1997),  Cameron and Englin 
(1997) for more on complexity).   13 
4  EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
The utility of each choice alternative is assumed to be a linear function of the attributes we use to 
describe the policy measures (see Fel! Hittar inte referenskälla.), as well as the socioeconomic 
and/or behavioral characteristics of the individuals. Our utility index V can then be written as: 
 
Our empirical model is a utility function for individual n who chooses among M alternatives: 
 
Unm = β Xnm +  Sn + nm              (6) 
 
As discussed in the theory section above, Xnm is the vector of policy measure attributes with β as 
the corresponding parameter vector (including a constant). While the parameters   indicate the 
importance of each of the  k attributes within the  individual‟s choice  (across alternatives),  the 
parameters  indicate  the  importance of socioeconomic characteristics  in choices  made by  the 
population (across individuals).  
 
The basic formulation in (6) means that we have four parameters to be estimated that are related to 
the attributes. Depending on specification, the number of parameters related to these attributes 
vary.  Two  of  the  attributes  –  representing  a  measure‟s  effect  on  environmentally-friendly 
technology  and  a  measure‟s  distribution  of  costs,  respectively  -  have  been  dummy  coded  to 
represent a possible nonlinear relationship in the attribute levels, whereas the other two variables 
are assumed to be linear in the attribute level (the AWARE attribute has only two attribute levels, 
thus precluding  nonlinear testing and the COST attribute was coded  in SEK terms  in order to 
estimate the  monetary  values of trade-offs). The constant can then be  interpreted as the  utility 
index level for the case when all dummies equal zero. The implication of the dummy coding is that 
the final specification has six parameters related to the four attributes (see Table 3 ). 
 
The  parameters represent the weight associated with each attribute and can be interpreted in 
several ways. First, the parameter values are called the main effects
19, as they measure the effect 
that a particular attribute level has on the dependent variable, choice (all else equal). Alternatively, 
they are referred to as marginal utilities or part-worths because they represent the partial value of 
utility represented by that attribute. A measurement of the utility change on an ordinal scale is not 
                                                 
19 The other commonly measured effect in the choice literature is an interactive effect, which is the effect on choice 
obtained by combining two or more attributes which would not have been observed had each of the attributes been 
estimated separately. We made the decision a priori to focus on main effects for this simple pilot study to avoid the 
additional data collection demands required for interactive effects.   14 
directly relevant to policy makers, who are usually  interested in the value of policy outcomes. 
Thus, a third way to interpret parameters is the marginal rate of substitution (ratio of parameters) 
between an attribute‟s level and money, which gives the monetary equivalent to the utility change 
a person experiences from the change in the attribute level (e.g., attribute's implicit price). 
Table 3. Explanation of parameters used in empirical model 
 Parameters ()  Description 
Marginal change in attribute level 
(base level  new level) 
Constant (0) 
a constant that reflects the utility 
level when dummy variables = 0  n/a 
T_NEG  Policy measure’s effect on the 
development of environmentally-
friendly technologies (TECH) 
“No effect”  “Negative effect” 
T_POS  “No effect”  “Positive effect” 
AWARE 
Policy measure’s affect on improving 
environmental awareness (AWARE) 
“No effect”  “Effect” 
a 
D_PROP  Policy measure’s cost distribution 
across society based on ability to pay 
(DIST) 
“Regressive”  “Proportional” 
D_PROG  “Regressive”  “Progressive” 
COST  Policy measure’s cost (COST)  100 SEK  300 SEK  1,000 SEK 
a 
q 
various socieconomic characteristics 
of the individual (see section 5) 
(varies) 
a represents a simple linear relationship between attribute levels 
 
A number of important considerations relate to our type of  unlabeled experiment (Hensher et al., 
2005, Section 5.3). In general, labeled experiments are ideal when the brand name or label of an 
alternative is expected to be an important consideration in an individual‟s choice. Including such a 
label  is assumed to  increase predictive  validity and  may also be  more realistic to  respondents 
(Blamey et al. 2000). The drawback to a labeled experiment is that a respondent may focus on the 
label and fail to consider the attributes closely.  An unlabeled experiment is preferable in studies 
that  focus on the  marginal rate of  substitution between  attributes (as  in  this study) because  it 
“encourages respondents [to give] more discerning and discriminating responses” rather than rely 
on  a  label  when  choosing  (quote  from  Blamey  et  al.  2000;  see  also  Alpizar  et  al  2001). 
Furthermore, when labels attached to alternatives represent a “significant emotional and symbolic 
content” (e.g., the stigma associated with a carbon tax), the use of unlabeled experiments will 
make  it easier  for respondents to  focus on  the  merits of  the  individual attributes themselves. 
Blamey et al. 2000 compare  model results  from a split sample choice experiment where each 
sample was either a labeled or unlabeled alternatives. They conclude that “the inclusion of policy 
labels appears to have reduced the attention respondents give to the attributes.” 
 
   15 
5  RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Following revisions from focus group testing, we distributed 228 surveys into mail boxes in urban 
and  rural  areas  in  Umeå  in  February  2008.  This  included  114  surveys  of  Block  A  and  B 
respectively.  For more information see Cole, 2008.  
 
After 15 days, 79 surveys were returned, of which 76 (33%) were complete and available for our 
data analysis (42  from  Block A and 34  from  Block B). Given  four choice questions with two 
alternatives each, this equates into 608 rows of choice data (4*2*76=608).   
 
Table 4. shows some of the more interesting descriptive statistics among the 76 respondents, along 
with  information  on  the  national  average  in  Sweden.  As  shown,  the  sample  is  not  entirely 
representative of Sweden. Our sample was older, more educated, had larger size households, and 
was “greener” than average (based on membership in environmental organizations). Our average 
income was approximately equal to the average from 1997. 
Table 4. Comparison of pilot sample characteristics to national average. 
Variable  Our Sample
1  Typical Swedish 
House Owners
2 
Gender (% male)  48  51 
Age (% share older than 65)  65  24 (1997) 
Average household income (SEK/month)  30,000  32,000 (1997) 
Households with 2 or more incomes (%)  74  (unknown) 
Membership in an environmental organization (%)  11  4 (2002) 
Household share with 2 or more children (%)  33  16 (2006) 
Education (% with university degree)  59  24 (1997) 
Commute to work each day by car (%)  70  (unknown) 
Believe  that  current  government  expenditures  on 
environmental protection is too low  64  (unknown) 
1 From our sample size of 76 respondents. 
2 Source: Statistics Sweden (see also Ek, 2002) 
 
Several questions in the survey were related to the choice experiment questions themselves (Figure 
1). First, a warm-up question described three possible attribute levels for the DIST attribute in the 
form of a question (similar questions existed for the other three attributes). The question gave an 
illustrative  example  of  a  regressive,  proportional,  and  progressive  cost  distribution  and  asked 
respondents which one represented the Swedish income tax system.  As shown, there was varying 
interpretation by respondents, though most economists would agree that the system is progressive. 
The second question was a “follow-up” to the choice experiment questions and asked respondents   16 
to rate the difficulty of  the six choice experiment questions on a  four  level ordinal scale.  As 
shown, more than two-thirds found the questions to be “pretty difficult” or “very difficult.”  
  
Which cost distribution alternative* is most 
consistent with the Swedish income tax system? 
How easy/difficult was it for you to choose 





*The question referred to “alternatives 1 through 3” which 
illustrated  regressive,  proportional,  and progressive,  cost 
distributions,  respectively,  without  referring  to  them  as 
such. 
 
Figure 1. Responses to the warm-up and follow-up questions. 
As a follow-up to the (unlabeled) choice scenarios, we asked respondents which type of (labeled) 
climate policy measure respondents prefer, given a government decision to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions  from  motor  vehicles.   The  multiple-choice  answers  included  labeled climate policy 
measures as follows (percent of respondents selecting that answer): 
  (13%) Higher tax on gasoline/diesel (making these fuels more expensive) 
  (46%) Information campaign (informing people how their transport choices affect the climate) 
  (31%) Regulation that forces people to use certain types of fuels (e.g., ethanol) or vehicles 
  (10%) Higher income tax to subsidize public transportation (train and bus) 
The purpose of this question was to determine whether respondents who favor a certain climate 
policy  measure by name (labeled question above) also exhibited consistent preferences  for the 
attribute  levels that best described that (unnamed)  measure  in  the choice experiment.  A strict 
comparison  of  preferences  is  difficult  because  the  CE  questions  related  to  carbon  dioxide 
reduction  in  general, while  this  follow-up question  related specifically  to the  transport sector. 
However the lack of an “opt-out/I don‟t agree” response was consistent across both questions.  
5.1  Empirical Results 
Our non-linear-in-the-attributes model is presented in Table 6.  The table provides a comparison of 
the magnitude, signs, standard errors, and estimated t-values across each of the parameters. It also   17 
includes  the  conditional
20  implicit  attribute  prices,  along  with  the  standard  errors  and 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. In addition, we provide the psuedo r
2 and the LL Value
21 
for the logistic regression. 
 
In addition to this “attributes only” model, we estimate several  models that included parameters 
for  socioeconomic  and  attitudinal  variables.  We  interacted  the  following  variables  with  the 
AWARE attribute to test this model: membership in an environmental organization, beliefs about 
current  governmental  environmental  expenditures,  gender,  age,  education,  income,  number  of 
children in household, number of income-earning adults in household, and location (urban/rural), 
but  none  of  these  parameters  were  significant  in  our  regression.  Therefore,  we  rely  on  an 
“attributes only” logistic model. 
 
All parameters in the model are significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level  and have 
the expected signs, with the exception of D_PROG which is discussed further below.  For example, 
compared  to policy  measures  that  have  “no effect” on  the spread of environmentally-friendly 
technologies,  measures  that  have  a  “negative  effect”  reduce  respondents‟  utility  (T_NEG)  but 
measures that  have a  “positive effect”  increase respondents‟  utility (T_POS). Interestingly,  the 
utility  increase associated with the  latter  is twice as big as the  utility decrease  for the  former, 
indicating that respondents are particularly keen to support climate policy measures that encourage 
technological development. This is also shown by the relatively high conditional implicit price for 
the T_POS attribute. The positive sign on the AWARE parameter indicates that respondents have a 
clear preference  for  measures  that  improve peoples‟ awareness of  how their actions affect  the 
climate, compared to  measures that have  no effect. This parameter was highly significant and 
robust across several different model specifications and has the smallest standard error. In general, 
respondents seemed less concerned about the distributional impacts of measures.  For example, 
compared to a measure whose cost is regressively distributed, respondents are indifferent about a 
change to a progressive distribution (D_PROG). There is a weak statistical relationship indicating an 
increase in utility when the marginal change is from a regressive to a proportional distributional 
                                                 
20 The implicit values are conditional on the fact that respondents must choose measure A or B without opting out. 
21  The pseudo r
2  in  a  logistic  regression provides  a  measure of  fit  relative  to some  base  model,  which  is  usually 
specified as a constants-only model. It has a similar interpretation to the r
2 from a linear  regression: higher values 
indicate better model fits. According to Domencish and McFadden 1975 (Henscher et al 2005, 10.3.6) a pseudo r
2 of 
0.3 is a pretty good logistic fit and corresponds to an r
2 of approximately 0.6 in a linear regression. The formula for 
computing a pseudo r
2 between an estimated model and an (assumed) base model is a simple function of the LL values 
(pseudo r
2 = [1 - (LLestimated model/LLbase model)].   18 
(D_PROP).
22 This result does not entirely match our  a priori assumption that respondents would 




The relative implicit prices calculated in LIMDEP are significant at the 10 percent level for three 
attributes: respondents value the marginal change from regressive to proportional cost distribution 
(138 SEK) lower than the positive effect on environmentally-friendly technologies (324 SEK) or 
the improvement in environmental awareness (300 SEK). Finally the (linear)  COST parameter is 
negative, as expected, indicating a decrease in utility as the attribute levels are increased.
24 
Table 6. Attributes-only non-linear model 
Parameter  Coeff. 
(SE of Coefficient)  t-value 
Conditional Implicit 
Price in SEK 
(WTP)
1,2 







3.12  257  
(85.18) 


















6.37  300 * 
(39.33) 


















-5.92  - 
 
Obs.  608 
Pseudo R  .104 
LL Value  -377.57 (Restricted LL
3 = - 421.44) 
1 At the time of the survey 1 SEK equaled approximately 0.1 Euros 
2 Standard error of the WTP was calculated using the WALD command for a random variable in  
LIMDEP; confidence intervals were calculated using WTP +/- (1.96)*(SE) 
3 Restricted LL is a “constants-only” model 
* significant at the 10 % level 
Parameters  for  the  various  socioeconomic  and  behavioral  variables  were  not  significant  and 
therefore excluded from our model 
                                                 
22 Henscher et al. 2005 discuss situations where one of two nonlinear dummy parameters is significant (p. 350). In 
general, it is reasonable to include both in the specification even if one of the parameters is not significant. 
23  We also tried a nonlinea r  specification  where  the  “proportional”  distribution  was  the  base  level  (instead  of 
regressive), but found that the parameter indicating the marginal change from “proportional  progressive” was not 
significant. 
24 We also tried a nonlinear specificat ion with the cost variable, where “100 SEK”  was the base level and COST1 
indicated a move to 300 SEK and COST2 indicated a move to 1,000 SEK. We found that the parameter on COST1 
was not significant, but the parameter on  COST2 was significant. Because our  model  is designed  to estimate the 
implicit price of the other attributes, we code the COST parameter in Swedish kronor.   19 
 
Next we test restrictions on our simple model above. The results of a Wald test (performed using 
LIMDEP 8.0) of linear restrictions indicate that the nonlinear relationships estimated in Table 6 
cannot be rejected. We reject the null hypothesis for the Wald test that the dummy parameters are 
equal to zero (e.g., T_NEG = T_POS = 0) based on a chi squared test statistic of 17.28.  Thus, the 
slopes are  indeed different (this  is  intuitive  given our  finding above that  respondents received 
twice the utility gain from the T_POS parameter compared to the T_NEG parameter).  A Wald test 
between the D_PROP and D_PROG parameters indicates that we cannot reject the null, which implies 
that a linear relationship might be appropriate here. However, we conduct a simultaneous Wald 
test where we restrict all four parameters at the same time (e.g., T_NEG = T_POS = 0 and D_PROP = 
D_PROG = 0), and reject the null hypothesis, indicating that the nonlinear relationship shown in 
Table 6 between these variables appears to be best. 
 
6  DISCUSSION 
This study provides policy-makers with guidance in how to develop carbon reduction policies that 
garner  public  support.  The  pilot  study  indicated  that  a  choice  experiment  is  reasonable  and 
workable approach for measuring citizen preferences for different types of properties associated 
with climate change measures. The survey data enabled us to estimate a statistical choice model 
that  resulted  in  reasonable  interpretations  of  our  four  attributes.    The  focus  on  attributes  of 
alternative policy  measures  – rather than the  welfare change  from  implementation of a carbon 
dioxide reduction policy – is both interesting and policy relevant. The results of this pilot study, 
therefore, suggest continued development of a nationwide survey along the same lines. 
 
This  survey  elicited  preferences  for  the  properties  of  climate  policy  measures  by  asking 
respondents to trade-off the cost of certain measures against other beneficial side-effects of the 
policy (e.g., its effect on technological development, climate awareness, and distributional impacts 
on  society).  Because  the  choice  experiment  approach  enforces  a  budget  constraint  upon 
respondents it avoids meaningless preference comparisons between “taxes on environmental bads” 
and “subsidies for environmental goods.” Importantly, the preferences revealed from our study 
assume that respondents chose between two equally-effective  measures
25 (both reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions by four percent), where some measures carry with them certain characteristics. 
Our survey results are intended to help inform  the design of future policy measures so that they 
                                                 
25 Note that we could have varied this variable to see how respondents value cost-effectiveness, but our focus was on 
preferences for reaching the current four percent target.   20 
reflect public preferences, rather than argue for specific instruments (e.g., tax, permit, regulation, 
etc). By incorporating public preferences, policymakers are more likely to garner support for their 
carbon reduction policies. 
 
The implications of the statistical analysis of the Umeå pilot study – which may or may not be 
replicated when tested within a more representative national Swedish sample – can be summarized 
in four points. A conclusion common to all four points is the "all else equal assumption" regarding 
the other three attribute levels i.e., changing these attribute levels may alter the preferences for 
attribute in question. 
 
First, awareness-raising is an important aspect of climate policy measures for which respondents 
are willing to pay. This result is consistent with respondents‟ answers to the follow-up labeled 
question, where nearly half of the respondents (46%) choose an “information campaign” as their 
favored policy for reducing motor vehicle emissions. The implication is that measures that educate 
the public about how human activities impact the climate is a preferred mechanism for inducing 
climate-friendly behavior.  This preference  implies  nothing about whether people will respond 
more  favorably  to  information campaigns compared to  taxes per se; rather that citizens  have 
positive preferences for measures that exhibit “awareness-raising” characteristics. 
 
Second,  respondents  favor  climate  measures  that  have  a  positive  side-effect  on  technological 
development and are willing to pay for this attribute. Their preferences are non-linear. That is, 
compared to measures that have “no effect” on technological development, measures that have a 
“positive effect” provide twice as much utility to respondents as measures that have a “negative 
effect”. One interpretation of this result is that the public has a preference for measures that exhibit 
characteristics of market mechanisms (e.g., taxes and permits), which has the effect of increasing 
the  marginal  cost  of  producing  carbon  dioxide,  leading  to  innovation  and  technological 
development. Thus, this result seems to indicate that citizens value the cost-effectiveness criteria 
in selecting a policy measure, where cost effectiveness is defined by our TECH attribute in Table 
2.  
 
Third, our statistical model indicates that respondents have a weak preference against measures 
with  a  regressive  cost  distribution.  Interestingly,  the  impact  of  having  a  progressive  cost 
distribution  (higher  income  people  carry  a  higher  burden)  had  no  effect  on  choice,  which  is 
counter-intuitive from our “ability to pay” a priori assumption about equity concerns. Possible 
interpretations  include  (1)  respondents  did  not  fully  understand  the  difference  between  our   21 
attribute  levels and therefore  were  unable to  state a clear preference  with respect to  the three 
levels; (2) people expressed a preference (although weakly) against regressive measures; (3) our 
non-representative pilot  study sample perhaps skewed these results; or (4) we  failed to define 
environmental equity in terms of how the majority of respondents think about fairness related to 
carbon dioxide emissions. It might be that respondents think of environmental equity in terms of 
the “polluter pays principle” (PPP) rather than the “ability to pay” (ATP) criterion. For example, 
Atkinson  and  Dietz,  2005  and  Atkinson  et  al  2000  found  that  equity  issues  are  important 
considerations  in  citizens‟  acceptance  of  environmental  policies  (e.g.,  local  air  pollution 
abatement).  It could be  that our survey  failed  to test  whether respondents prefer policies that 
distribute a higher burden to individuals or sectors in Sweden that are (relatively) more responsible 
for pollution. In other words, we may have a missing, or poorly-defined, attribute problem, which 
results in less reliable model. 
 
Fourth,  it  is  possible  that  we  failed  to  capture  another  important  attribute  of  climate  policy 
measures:  namely  where  the  carbon  dioxide  reduction  takes  place.  Because  carbon  dioxide 
reduction policies create  global environmental benefits, one  might assume  that  the country  in 
which the reduction is implemented is meaningless. But do respondents think this way? In a future 
version of this survey we plan to include an attribute that identifies the level at which the policy is 
implemented (e.g., Sweden, Europe, outside of Europe) in order to determine whether this has an 
impact on choice (e.g., do Swedes feel a moral obligation to reduce carbon dioxide at home or are 
they willing to reduce abroad?). To the extent this is an attribute that citizens consider important, 
our decision to exclude it in the choice experiment implies that our utility specification is wrong. 
Thus, this variance is captured by the error term.     22 
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Appendix 1:  Experimental Design 
 
Our experimental design  relies  upon a  simple orthogonal
26  main effects plan (OMEP) that is 
generated by SPSS‟s generate orthogonal design feature, based upon the number of parameters we 
wish  to estimate  (four). We  then (non-randomly)  group  the  generated alternatives (profiles or 
“treatment combinations”)  into our  two-alternative choice sets (see strategy #1  in Street  et al 
2005).    This  simple  design  approach  ensures  the  uncorrelated  estimation  of  the  main  effect 
parameters only. 
 
In order to generate an OMEP, we first identify basic assumptions about our model. We assume an 
unlabeled experiment consisting of two alternatives in each choice set. Each choice set has four 
attributes, of which one is described using two attribute levels, and the other three rely on three 
levels. A full factorial design – an enumeration of all possible combinations of attribute levels – 
would result in 54 treatment combinations (2
1 x 3
3 = 54), or 27 choice experiment questions in our 
case. This is an unrealistic respondent burden. To reduce the size of the experimental design we 
present respondents with only a “fraction” of the full treatment combinations by arranging our 
survey attributes into an orthogonal design and then (non-randomly) selecting attribute levels to 
fill the treatment combination rows.  
 
Before generating an orthogonal design we must first determine the minimum number of degrees 
of freedom (i.e., treatment combinations) required for our model.  We assume we will estimate 
four parameters (one for each attribute) based on a  linear utility function.
27 Thus, the minimum 
treatment combinations required for our experiment is given by (Hensher et al., (2005) Table 
5.10): 
 
Minimum number of treatment combinations for an unlabeled choice 
experiment – fractional factorial design with main effects and nonlinear effects 
in attribute levels 
=  (L-1) x A + 1  (9) 
 
where  A  is  the  number  of  attributes  and  L  is  the  number  of  attribute  levels.  Thus,  in  our 
experiment, we require at least 10 treatment combinations (degrees of freedom): three attributes 
have three levels (TECH, DIST, and COST) and therefore require 8 degrees of freedom [(3-1) x 
3+1 = 8] and the other attribute requires 2 degrees of freedom [(2-1) x 1+1 = 2]. Then we add 
                                                 
26 An orthogonal design is a mathematical constraint that ensures all attribute levels are statistically independent of 
one another. In labeled experiments it is important that attributes are uncorrelated across alternatives. In our unlabeled 
experiment (or  labeled experiments that estimate generic parameters), the criterion is  less strict:  within-alternative 
orthogonality is the objective. 
27 This is required for our MNL model. We will utilize effects coding to allow f or nonlinear effects associated with 
changes in the attribute levels.   26 
them together (8+2=10). Because this  is a pilot study, we  want the survey  instrument  to  look 
reasonably similar to the eventual larger survey study.  Because this larger study will likely test for 
interactive effects (requiring additional degrees of freedom), we felt it would be appropriate to 
include two extra treatment combinations for a minimum of 12.   
 
Authors Note: In the original thesis, I assumed this to be 12 treatment combinations instead of the 
minimum of 10.  The effect of requiring 12 combinations instead of the true minimum of 10 was to 
increase the respondent burden. However, it is likely that by increasing the “minimum treatment 
combinations” we were able to capture additional information from our design, which may have 
improved the statistical efficiency of our model.  In what follows below I explain the statistical 
design assuming that we require at least 12 treatment combinations. 
 
Next we rely on SPSS‟s Generate Orthogonal Design function, which uses the minimum number 
of treatment combinations required in our design as the main input, along with a coding structure 
for the attributes and a blocking variable.
28 The SPSS program output tells us that the minimum 
number of treatment combinations that ensures orthogonality in our experiment is 16. This implies 
eight choice experiments questions per survey. However, we divide the survey into two blocks 
(Block A and Block B), which means each survey will have four choice experiment questions and 
that two respondents are required to complete the block.
29  
 
As a final step, we distribute these treatment combinations into the actual CE questions in the 
survey  in a non-random  manner.  Assigning these treatment combinations randomly  into our 
choice experiment questions might lead to overlap (i.e., attributes levels may repeat themselves in 
a choice set) or  imbalance (level may appear with unequal frequency in our design). Thus, by 
assigning these treatment combinations non-randomly we can address these issues of overlap and 
imbalance. In addition, we can  reduce choice sets that are  highly complex (where  “complex” 
means all attribute levels are changing within a choice set, thus increasing the cognitive burden).  
For more detailed information on how treatment combinations were created see the appendices in 
Cole 2008. 
 
                                                 
28 The blocking variable divides the surveys into two blocks: A and B such that two surveys must be answered to 
complete a block. The purpose of blocking is to reduce the number of choice sets each respondent faces. 
29 Note that our mailed survey actually had six choice experiment questions per survey. The fifth CE question was 
taken from the opposite Block to test for differences between blocks and the sixth CE question presented an 
“unrealistically dominant” alternative to see whether respondents were rationally considering the attribute levels when 
choosing. 